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Abstract—Cellular mobile networks are used by more than 4
billion users worldwide. One effective way to meet the increasing
demand for data rates is to deploy femtocells, which are low-
power base stations that connect to the mobile operator through
the subscriber’s residential Internet access. Yet, security and
privacy issues in femtocell-enabled cellular networks, such as
UMTS and LTE, still need to be fully addressed by the stan-
dardization bodies. In this paper, we review significant threats to
the security and privacy of femtocell-enabled cellular networks.
We also propose novel solution directions in order to tackle some
of these threats by drawing inspiration from solutions to similar
challenges in wireless data networks such as WLANs and mobile
ad hoc networks (MANETs).
I. INTRODUCTION
The use of mobile devices has changed since the advent
of digital technologies such as GSM. What started as a voice
only service, has been upgraded to support data traffic as well.
With modern smartphones, users are able to browse the Inter-
net and obtain services such as ebanking, navigation, social
networking and recommendations based on the subscriber’s
location. Femtocells, which are low-power and low-range base
stations for cellular networks installed by users at their own
premises, are believed to meet the surge in data rates that
these multimedia and interactive services require. They offload
the macrocell network and provide backhaul connections to
the cellular operators’ networks through the users’ residential
broadband accesses [7].
Long Term Evolution (LTE) is the mobile network tech-
nology for the next generation mobile communications, as
defined by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) [1].
In addition to features such as increased data-rates, lower
latencies and better spectral efficiency, one of the most in-
teresting aspects is the radically novel all-IP core network
architecture, known as Evolved Packet Core (EPC). LTE is
expected to make extensive use of user-installed femtocells, in
order to achieve its goals of spectral efficiency and high-speed
for a greater number of users. It is clear that the sensitivity
and confidentiality of users and data transiting in such digital
cellular networks is paramount both to businesses and private
users.
Security and privacy in such networks is achieved at several
levels in their architectures, such as the air interface, the
operator’s internal network and the inter-operator links. The
main assumption underlying the security of legacy mobile
networks, such as GSM and UMTS, is the trust that each
operator has in its own infrastructure and in other operators
with whom it has a roaming agreement. Clearly, the evolution
to LTE and its flat all-IP core network emphasizes the urgency
for a revision of trust relationships among operators and their
network components, as both their exposure and vulnerability
to external threats are greatly affected. For instance, it has be-
come easier for a malicious user to tamper with the femtocell
in order to access confidential data, as it resides directly at the
user’s premises, or to disrupt the legitimate communications
both at the femtocell and at the core network level, due to the
openness of the IP networks.
Our goal in this paper is to raise awareness about security
and privacy issues in femtocell-enabled cellular networks,
such as LTE, by reviewing some significant security threats
and countermeasures. Our solutions are inspired from similar
research efforts in the WLAN and mobile ad hoc network
(MANET) research community.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II
we review present security and privacy threats in femtocell-
enabled networks, with a focus on user data privacy and
robustness of the core network. In Section III we discuss
possible solution directions and their challenges. We conclude
the paper in Section IV.
II. SECURITY AND PRIVACY CHALLENGES
Figure 1 shows the threat model for a femtocell-enabled
mobile network. The three vulnerable elements are indicated
by arrows: (i) the air interface between the mobile device
(User Equipment) and the femtocell (Home(e)NodeB), (ii)
the femtocell itself and (iii) the public link between the
femtocell and the security gateway (SecGW). Our intent is
to focus on certain attacks on the aforementioned elements,
which are achievable without breaking the cryptosystems or
the protocols. A more exhaustive list of all possible attacks
and countermeasures can be found in [2].
A. Attacks on the Air Interface
The attacks on the air interface can be either passive
(the attacker only passively listens to the communications
between the mobile device and the base station) or active (in
addition to listening, the attacker injects or modifies the data).
Although prerogatives for active attacks have been mitigated
by cryptographically protecting the messages sent over the air,
passive attacks, such as traffic analysis and user tracking, are
still possible.
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Figure 1. Three different targets for malicious attacks on femtocell-enabled
mobile networks: (i) the air interface between the mobile device (User
Equipment) and the femtocell (Home(e)NodeB), (ii) the femtocell itself and
(iii) the public link between the femtocell and the security gateway.
The issue of user identity protection was already raised
in the early GSM networks, and the solution that has been
adopted ever since has never been substantially revisited. With
the ongoing migration towards all-IP and femtocell-enabled
cellular networks, the legacy solution might not be appropri-
ately suited anymore. In fact, GSM, UMTS and LTE standards
mandate the use of unlinkable temporary identifiers (TMSIs
[3] and GUTIs [4]) to protect the identity of mobile devices
at the air interface, but the capillary deployment of femtocells
might render this insufficient to guarantee a satisfactory level
of protection for the users. TMSIs (or GUTIs) are usually
unchanged in a given location (or tracking) area, which is
composed by up to a hundred adjacent cells, and femtocells
could make it possible for malicious users not only to track the
movements of mobile subscribers, but due to the low range,
to have an unprecedented accuracy as well. For instance, such
tracking attacks could be perpetrated by curious employers, in
order to monitor whether an employee is visiting a competitor,
or by governmental agencies, in order to illegitimately track
people’s locations.
Subscriber identity and tracking are the emerging threats at
the air interface in femtocell-enabled mobile networks. Solu-
tions that are suited for such networks can be inspired from
the experience gained by the research community in MANETs.
In particular, studies such as [5], [8] suggest directions for a
more dynamic and context-aware location privacy protection
mechanisms. We discuss the most relevant aspects in Section
III.
B. Attacks on the Femtocell
From the perspective of a mobile device, being connected
to a regular base station, i.e., (e)NodeB, or a femtocell is
equivalent, because the protocols and security standards used
at the air interface are exactly the same. From a malicious
user’s point of view, it makes a substantial difference because
it is much easier for a malicious user to tamper with a small
and inexpensive (£120 [15]) femtocell than it could be with
a large and complicated device located on a rooftop. The
physical size, material quality, lower cost components and the
IP interface of the femtocell make it more suited for reverse
engineering and tampering than a traditional, more expensive
and business-grade (e)NodeB base station.
As the over-the-air user data encryption is terminated at the
femtocell, hardware tampering with the device could expose
the private information of the unsuspecting user. For instance,
if an adversarial user is able to set the femtocell to accept all
external users without having to register them first, as opposed
to having a Closed Subscriber Group (CSG), he would be
able to analyze their communications. Moreover, attacks such
as device impersonation, Internet protocol attacks on the net-
work services, false location reporting or simply unauthorized
reconfiguration of the onboard radio equipment could hinder
the network operator from controlling interference and power
management features. This could have severe consequences
on the quality of service. To this end, femtocells should be
equipped with trusted execution environments (TrE) [2] that
render malicious manipulation of the onboard software and the
on-the-wire sniffing very hard to achieve. However, as fem-
tocells are authorized to operate only on specific geographic
areas, false location reporting issues could still arise if IP-only
geo-localization techniques are be deployed. This is because,
in order to manipulate the source IP address of the femtocell,
there would be no need to physically tamper with it.
C. Attacks on the Core Network
The large scale deployment of comparatively less expen-
sive femtocells is a good alternative for mobile operators as
it avoids expensive upgrades to the backbone connections.
However, the exposure of the core network’s point of entrance
to the public Internet has a severe drawback: it renders most
Internet-based attacks, such as Denial of Service (DoS, dis-
cussed in Section III) or impersonation attacks, feasible against
the mobile network operators. Let us focus on the implications
of the exposure of public IP addresses of security gateways
to the Internet, which are required by a large number of
femtocells in order for the whole system to function properly.
DoS attacks (as well as Distributed DoS, DDoS) are a well
known occurrence in large companies (such as eBay, Amazon
or Yahoo [10]) that host a multitude of web-based services. In
order to deal with such attacks in a systematic way, Mirkovic
[11] proposes a general classification of attacks and defense
mechanisms such that system developers and researchers can
better observe and react to the inherently different attacks by
exploiting their common traits. If the detection of ongoing
DDoS attacks is best performed at the victim site, many
researchers ([14], [6], [12], [13]) agree that a distributed
solution is better suited against large-scale DDoS attacks than
a solution localized only at the final link with the target. The
reason is that the suppression mechanisms are most effective
near the sources of the attack, as it is possible to filter the
malicious traffic from the genuine connections and to avoid
that it even reaches and saturates the final link with the target.
But the requirement for these solutions to succeed is that
different ISPs are able and willing to cooperate to provide
protection. Failure to reach an agreement could jeopardize the
effectiveness of their solutions.
For a mobile network operator, this means that an effective
protection against DDoS attacks needs to encompass not only
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ing ISPs. Together, they could both limit the femtocell service
disruption at the security gateways and ensure the service
delivery to the femtocell subscribers. However, cooperation
among ISPs is best achieved when all concerned parties have
incentives to jointly protect the mobile operators’ gateways.
We further discuss this issue in the following section.
III. DISCUSSION
In this section, we present solution directions to the two
most relevant issues discussed in Section II, i.e., identity and
location tracking at the air interface and distributed DDoS
defense for the core network.
A solution to the issue of identity and location tracking
consists of an adaptive scheme to assign and change identifiers
based on context. This would require the mobile devices
to dynamically decide when to change identifiers, based on
their own observation of the surroundings and thus move
away from the network controlled strategy to a user-triggered
ID change strategy. For instance, when planning a cellular
network, mobile operators have to decide where and how many
base stations to install, in order to provide an optimal trade-
off between service quality, availability and cost. A densely
populated area will usually have many more cells than a
rural area with a lower population density. As each cell has
a unique cell ID, a mobile device is able to assess whether
the current location has a high cell density or not by reading
the cell broadcast messages. Moreover, the majority of recent
feature-phones and smartphones are equipped with Bluetooth
radio technology for low-range ad hoc connectivity. Combined
with the cell ID broadcast messages, Bluetooth can be used
to define more precisely the number of neighboring devices
and to trigger the coordinated temporary ID (or pseudonym)
change. Network and device parameters such as neighborhood
density, device speed, mobility patterns and neighborhood
dynamics affect the effectiveness of the ID change and, as also
shown in [8], they should be used when making ID change
decisions.
The second challenge for mobile networks with publicly
accessible IP interfaces concerns the vulnerability to Internet-
based DDoS attacks. Several well-known solutions for thwart-
ing such threats and attacks exist, such as network analysis
[13], [12] and client puzzles [16]. But, as the effectiveness of
these solutions relies on several participating entities (ISPs),
incentives for the cooperation among them need to be studied.
One framework that has been extensively applied to security
studies for cooperation among self-interested parties is Game
Theory [9]. A game-theoretic framework will allow us to study
the incentives, predict the outcomes and distribute individual
profits that are optimal, with respect to a given criteria,
and commensurate to the role of each individual ISP in the
protection of the security gateways. By using information
such as the ISP’s national Internet traffic share, femtocell
penetration and subscriber base, the model could determine
the best strategies for each ISP, which would guarantee the
highest profit in any given situation.
IV. CONCLUSION
The control over security and privacy in the next generation
of mobile networks, such as LTE, is held solely by the core
network. On one hand, this is beneficial as it ensures the trust
relationship between subscriber and home network. On the
other hand, it impedes dynamic and mobile device controlled
actions that could guarantee a better protection.
In this paper, we have reviewed some significant threats
to security and privacy in femtocell-enabled mobile networks
and have presented solution directions to mitigate two among
the most relevant and immediate ones. First, we discussed
the issue related to the identity and location tracking with
femtocell technology. We have shown that by using contextual
information such as node density, device speed and mobility
pattern, the mobile device-triggered ID change can reduce
the risk of being tracked. Second, we suggested a novel
approach towards the protection of the mobile network against
Internet-based DDoS attacks. Successful incentive strategies,
stimulating cooperation among local ISPs, could ensure an
efficient protection and, at the same time, enable a transparent
service for legitimate users.
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